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Abstract
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1I Introduction
In the labor-matching model with wage bargaining (Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and
Pissarides (2000), henceforth MP), produced goods are instantaneously sold and con-
sumed. In reality, ﬁrms need time to sell their production and consumers spend time
looking for the goods they like. In the US, on the basis of the data provided by Kahn and
McConnell (2002), it takes nowadays on average about 5 months to sell inventories. This
paper builds a macroeconomic model where interactions between frictions on the product
and the labor markets can be easily analyzed.
We consider an economy where the act of purchase is separated from the act of sale (no
double coincidence of wants). With anonymous agents, money is needed for transactions
(see e.g. Kocherlakota 1998). Most research in monetary macroeconomics uses shortcuts
to introduce money in the models. The most common ones are the Clower’s Cash-In-
Advance (CIA) constraint and Sidrauski’s Money In the Utility function assumption (MIU)
; see Walsh (1998). The MIU speciﬁcation is justiﬁed by the idea that money makes
transaction easier and as such generates utility. Shopping-time models go a step further in
this direction by making the technology of trade explicit. We add congestion externalities
on the product market. Following the MP research where the introduction of a matching
function on the labor market is very convenient, we introduce a similar matching function
o nt h ep r o d u c tm a r k e t 1.G i v e nt h ea s s u m p t i o n sm a d ea b o u tt h eg o o d sa n dt h ep r e f e r e n c e s ,
we show that the arguments of this matching function are the real money stock and the
aggregate stock of inventories.
The usual explanation for the demand constraints on the product market is the Key-
nesian assumption of nominal rigidities. However, the New Keynesian micro-foundations
for these rigidities are not very convincing in our long run perspective. We build our ﬂex-
ible price model step by step. For pedagogical reason, we start with a ﬁxed price model
and then turn to a model with endogenous price on the product market. Throughout the
paper, wage bargaining is assumed on the labor market.
The equilibrium unemployment rate is characterized as in the MP model with a single
change: The productivity level is multiplied by an inversely U-shaped function of tightness
on the product market (i.e. the real money stock divided by the level of inventories). The
unemployment rate is then a U-shaped function of tightness on the product market. Two
opposite eﬀects are at work. When the product market becomes more tight, ﬁrms sell
their inventories more rapidly and this stimulates the creation of vacancies. However,
entrepreneurs are also consumers. When the product market becomes more tight, the
1In Wasmer and Weil (2004) the modeling of frictions in the credit market is inspired by the modeling
approach on the labor market.
2money made by the sale of their production is less rapidly transformed in a purchase. As
only consumption aﬀects the utility level of agents, this eﬀect is detrimental to the opening
of vacancies. When tightness is suﬃciently low on the product market, we show that the
ﬁrst eﬀect dominates. The opposite is true above a certain threshold. This explains the
U-shaped relationship between unemployment and tightness on the product market.
To make prices endogenous, we assume a Competitive Search mechanism à la Moen
(1997). Sellers post take-it-or-leave-it prices. This information is common knowledge.
Consumers direct their search according to the observed price oﬀers. Once agents have se-
lected a submarket characterized by a speciﬁc price, they still have to search for goods they
like. At our unique symmetric equilibrium, tightness on the product market maximizes
the value of inventories and minimizes the equilibrium unemployment rate.
We then introduce money growth. Money is neutral in this economy but not super
neutral. Inﬂation introduces a depreciation process of money holdings. It aﬀects the
creation of vacancies since this depreciation reduces the purchasing power of money held
by entrepreneurs in the interim between sale and purchase. We show that the level of
equilibrium unemployment is an increasing function of the inﬂation rate.
From a social welfare viewpoint, what only matters is the pace at which a unit of pro-
duced good is consumed by an agent, whoever (s)he is. We show that the equilibrium value
of tightness is ineﬃciently low on the product market. For this reason, the unemployment
rate is ineﬃciently high.
Other papers have already stressed that ﬁrms face diﬃculties in selling their output
because of search frictions on the product market. The seminal paper being Diamond
(1982) considers a barter economy. Because the matching technology implicitly exhibits
increasing returns to scale, there is a multiplicity of equilibria. Howitt (1985) replicates the
argument of Diamond in a model that distinguishes labor and product markets. Diamond
(1984) extends Diamond (1982) to a monetary economy.
Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) explain how the existence of frictions on the product
market gives a convincing micro-foundation for the use of money as a medium of exchanges.
Money has an essential role to play because of three things. 1) A double coincidence
problem arises in an environment where trade is decentralized and time-consuming; 2)
There is a lack of commitment and 3) there is private information concerning trading
histories (Kocherlakota 1998). However, in these papers, money is indivisible and agents
either own zero or one unit of money.
Monetary policy issues require the introduction of divisible money, which leads to
analytical problems. The reason is the key role that is typically played by distribution
of money holdings. Therefore, these models can only be solved numerically (see Molico
32006) or some simplifying assumptions are needed. Shi (1997, 1998) considers a model
w h e r eal a r g ef a m i l yi sc o m p o s e do fd i ﬀerent members. Each of them produce, consume
and trade in decentralized frictional markets. But at the end of each period, money is
redistributed equally across household members. Lagos and Wright (2005) propose an
alternative. Agents act individually but in addition to presence of frictional markets,
there exists a frictionless market. Moreover, individuals have quasi-linear preferences over
the good exchanged in the latter market. Therefore, they leave this market with the same
amount of money. These alternatives enable to reduce the distribution of money holding
to a mass point.
In Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), Shi (1997), Lagos and Wright (2005) and Molico (2006)
among others, the probabilities to ﬁnd a trading partner are exogenous. In Shi (1998) and
Berentsen Rocheteau and Shi (2007), buyers and sellers can increase these probabilities
by exerting a costly search eﬀort. In Rocheteau and Wright (2005), these probabilities
are functions of the relative numbers of buyers and sellers. An alternative is proposed
by Diamond and Yellin (1990) where ﬁrms supply all their inventories. In this model,
each worker can only search for a single unit of good at a time and only if she owns
enough money. Therefore, as in Molico (2006) the distribution of money holdings is key
to determine the equilibrium. Conversely, in our model, any consumer can costlessly and
simultaneously demand several goods with an upper limit, namely her real money holdings.
Therefore, a rise in individual money holdings raises linearly the ﬂow of purchased goods.
This linearity makes the distribution of money holdings useless to deﬁne the equilibrium.
Our conclusion that inﬂation increases equilibrium unemployment is ﬁnally related to
Cooley and Hansen (1989) and Cooley and Quadrini (1999, 2004). Cooley and Hansen
provide some empirical support to this conclusion. However, non-employment is driven
by labor supply decisions in their theoretical model. Conversely, Cooley and Quadrini
(1999, 2004) introduce search-matching frictions on the labor market. However, in these
three papers, money is introduced thanks to Cash-In-Advance assumptions. Bertensen,
Menzio and Wright (2006) and Lehmann (2006) investigate the superneutrality of money
on inﬂation in models with search unemployment and micro-founded use of money along
the search paradigm. They too ﬁnd that higher inﬂation increases unemployment.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the environment in the next section.
The ﬁxed price equilibrium is described in Section III. Assuming exogenous price is not
a very relevant assumption for a steady-state equilibrium. We made it essentially for
pedagogical reasons in order to build a more general model step by step. Endogenous
pricing is introduced in section IV, through price posting. This model is further extended
in Section V, where money grows at a constant rate to investigate the superneutrality
4of money. Section VI challenges the eﬃciency of the equilibrium, and the last section
concludes.
II Environment
Time is discrete. All agents are risk neutral, live forever and have a common discount
rate r>0. Only steady states are considered. Money is storable, divisible and is the
unique medium of exchange. There is no credit market. Trades in the labor and in the
product markets are uncoordinated and time-consuming. We assume two types of agents:
entrepreneurs and workers. There is a continuum of both types.
Workers are either employed or unemployed and their total measure is normalized to
1. While employed, their earnings allow them to accumulate money holdings. Whether
employed or unemployed, they use their money holdings to express a demand for produced
goods.
Entrepreneurs are simultaneously employers, sellers and buyers. Entrepreneurs post
an endogenous number of vacancies. Posting a vacancy entails a ﬂow disutility cost.
An entrepreneur recruit only unemployed individuals 2. A job is created when a vacancy
matches an unemployed worker and the Nash bargain over the wage leads to an agreement.
Produced goods are indivisible, storable and heterogeneous. Each good is unique and
cannot be reproduced. Put diﬀerently, a given type of good can only be produced once
and in quantity one. During a period, a ﬁlled job produces a (large) number q of diﬀerent
types of goods. These produced goods are added to the ﬁrms’ inventories and supplied on
the product market.
Individuals, whether they are workers or entrepreneurs, derive utility whenever they
ﬁnd a good they are looking for. In particular, neither an entrepreneur nor an employed
worker is interested in consuming the goods she has produced. Therefore, each entrepre-
neur has to supply her inventories on the product market, waiting for a buyer that will
be interested in one of the goods she is supplying. There is a double-coincidence problem:
When an entrepreneur ﬁnds a good to consume, the producer of this good is not interested
in consuming what the former entrepreneur produces. Trade is anonymous and there is
no record keeping technology. Therefore, money is used as a medium of exchange (see
Kocherlakota 1998). In case of a meeting, the money made by the sale is used for two
purposes: to pay the worker and to express a demand on the product market.
2We rule out the possibility that an entrepreneur becomes self-employed or recuit another entrepreneur.
We also rule out on-the-job search.
5III The Fixed Price model
In this section, the prices are ﬁxed on the product market while wages are bargained
over. A given period is divided between a labor market (production) sub-period and a
product market (consumption) sub-period. During the labor market sub-period, Firms
decide whether or not they open vacancies. The aggregate number of vacancies at that
moment is3 υ−1. Job destruction and Job creation take place simultaneously. The wage
W is then bargained over. The wage is actually a kind of piece rate in the sense that
it is proportional to the (random) quantity of goods sold in step 2c. Since workers and
entrepreneurs are risk-neutral, they bargain over the expected (monetary) wage E(W).
In stage 1d each ﬁlled vacancy produces q units of goods. This ends the labor market
subperiod. The product market sub-period starts with entrepreneurs’ supply decisions.
Then, workers and entrepreneurs express their demand decisions. Trade takes place on
the product market. Finally, entrepreneurs use part of the money made by the sales to
pay their employees (see Figure 1).
1b: Job Creation 














Labor market Product market
1a: Vacancy 
decisions
Figure 1: The timing of events in the Fixed Price Model
This section ﬁrst describes the functioning of the labor (III.1) and of the product (III.2)
markets. The emphasis is on the way we model frictions. Then we turn to the behavior
of workers (III.3) and the one of entrepreneurs (III.4). We then characterizes the labor
market equilibrium (III.5) and ﬁnally the ﬁxed price equilibrium (III.6).
III.1 Job Creation and Job destruction
We start by describing the job creation and job destruction processes in the labor market.
Firms open υ−1 vacancies during stage 1a. At the beginning of stage 1b, there are u−1
unemployed workers and 1 − u−1 employed workers. We deﬁne tightness on the labor
3In all the paper, values at the past (next) period are indexed −1 (+1).
6market as the ratio θ−1 = υ−1/u−1. To form a job, an unemployed worker and a job have
to meet. Following the literature, we assume that this meeting process is imperfect. Let
H (u,υ) be the number of meetings between u unemployed workers and υ vacancies. The
following assumption is standard in the labor-matching literature.
Assumption AS 1 The (labor market) matching function is assumed to be continuously
diﬀerentiable, increasing and concave in both arguments, to yield constant returns to scale
and to verify the following boundary properties for any (u,υ):
H (u,0) = H (0,υ)=0 l i m
υ7→+∞
H (u,υ)=u and lim
u7→+∞
H (u,υ)=υ
The monotonicity and boundary conditions imply that for any (u,υ), H (u,υ) ≤
min(u,υ).D e ﬁne the labor market matching elasticity as η(θ)=u · H0
u/H (u,υ).E a c h










This job ﬁlling probability h(.) i sad e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no fθ.I tv a r i e sf r o m1 to 0 when θ
increases from 0 to +∞.L e t−η(θ)=θh0 (θ)/h(θ) be its elasticity. Symmetrically, each
unemployed worker ﬁnds a job with probability









This job ﬁnding probability is an increasing function of θ and varies from 0 to 1 when θ
increases from 0 to +∞. Its elasticity equals 1 − η (θ). Hence, η(θ) ∈ (0,1).
We assume that each job ends with an exogenous probability s ∈ (0,1). Hence, in each
period, s(1 − u) jobs are dissolved and H (u,v)=u · θh(θ) jobs are created. Unemploy-
ment therefore evolves according to:
u = u−1 + s(1 − u−1) − H (u−1,υ−1)=s(1 − u−1)+( 1− θ−1h(θ−1)) · u−1





So, characterizing θ is suﬃcient to obtain the steady-state value of unemployment. The
tighter the labor market, the lower the unemployment rate.
III.2 The working of the product market
Trade in the product market requires a meeting between a consumer and an entrepreneur
(a seller). With a certain probability, this meeting leads to trade, that is to the exchange of
7p units of money against a single unit of good. For the consumer, this exchange generates
a utility level normalized to unity for the consumer at the end of the period.
Consider an entrepreneur who owns ζ units of inventories at Stage 2a of a given period.
We assume that an entrepreneur can simultaneously supply many diﬀerent goods. Let σ
be the number of goods she supplies. An entrepreneur is not allowed to supply goods that
she has not yet produced. We therefore impose:
0 ≤ σ ≤ ζ (2)
We treat consumers in a symmetric way. Consider a consumer with money holdings
m ≥ 0 at Stage 2b of a given period. This consumer can be an entrepreneur, an employed
worker or an unemployed one. We assume that any consumer can simultaneously search
for diﬀerent types of goods. Let d ≥ 0 be the number of goods she is currently searching
for or equivalently the number of units of demand she expresses. Expressing a unit of
demand means searching for a certain type of good. Under our matching technology on
the product market (to be described), there is always a positive, if small, probability that
all units of demand will be satisﬁed. Furthermore, we assume that when a consumer ﬁnds
the good she is looking for, she cannot default on paying. Hence, by demanding d units
o fg o o d s ,ac o n s u m e rm u s tb ea b l et os p e n dp times d units of money. In the absence of
a credit technology, the demand expressed by a consumer has to satisfy:
0 ≤ p · d ≤ m (3)
Modelling the meeting process between demand for and supply of heterogeneous goods
is beyond the scope of this paper. Our objective is instead to build an analytically tractable
model that incorporates trading frictions in both markets. As each good is assumed to
be unique, product market frictions do not qualitatively diﬀer from those observed on the
labor market. We therefore model trades in the product market and in the labor market
in a similar way. Let Σ and D be respectively the total amounts of supply and demand
expressed at the beginning of stage 2c. We assume that the number of trades is given by
a product market matching function T (Σ,D).
We introduce a matching eﬀectiveness parameter denoted μ0,w i t hμ0 ∈ [0,1].T h i s
parameter is an implicit argument in function T (Σ,D). Basically, one has T (Σ,D)=
μ0 · τ (Σ,D), where function τ (.,.) is independent to μ0.
Assumption AS 2 The (product market) matching function T (.,.) i sa s s u m e dt ob ec o n -
tinuously diﬀerentiable, increasing and concave in both arguments, to exhibit constant re-
turns to scales, and to verify the following boundary properties for any (Σ,D):
T (Σ,0) = T (0,D)=0 l i m
Σ→∞
T (Σ,D)=μ0 · D and lim
D→∞
T (Σ,D)=μ0 · Σ
8Since μ0 ≤ 1,f o ra n y(Σ,D),w eh a v eT (Σ,D) ≤ min(Σ,D).L e tφ = D/Σ denote
tightness on the product market. The demand (satisfying) probability 4 is deﬁned as the










As the product market becomes tighter, the congestion-search externality makes the de-
mand probability decreasing from μ0 to 0. Symmetrically, the supply (satisfying) proba-
bility is deﬁned as the probability at which a unit of inventory is sold:









As the product market becomes tighter, supplied goods are sold more quickly. So, the
supply probability increases from 0 to μ0. Hence, for a given tightness φ, μ(φ) and φμ(φ)
are linear in μ0.A sμ0 increases, matching in the product market become easier.
We deﬁne the elasticity of the product market matching function as ε(φ) ≡− φ ·
μ0 (φ)/μ(φ).F r o ma b o v e ,w eg e tt h a tε(φ) ∈ (0,1). The following technical assumption
will appear very useful:
Assumption AS 3 ε(φ) is nondecreasing.
An example of matching function that satisﬁes AS2 is the CES speciﬁcation: with a








This speciﬁcation further veriﬁes Assumption AS3 when σ ∈ (0,1).
Each of the 1 − u jobs produces q units of goods per period. The ﬂow of produced
g o o d si st h e r e f o r e(1 − u)q.A ﬂow of T (Σ,D) units of supply is purchased. Finally,
through a depreciation process, we assume that each unit of inventory is dissolved with
probability δ ≥ 0. This depreciation probability is exogenous. Aggregate inventories S
therefore evolve according to:
S+1 =( 1− δ)S +( 1− u)q − T (Σ,D)=( 1− δ) · S +( 1− u)q − φμ(φ) · Σ (4)
III.3 The workers’ program
T h em a t c h i n gp r o c e s so nt h ep r o d u c tm a r k e tb eing stochastic, there is a (small but)
positive probability that an entrepreneur sells no good during stage 2c. If furthermore her
money holdings are very small, she can be liquidity constrained and therefore unable to
4Our demand satisfying rate corresponds to the money velocity rate in monetary economics.
9pay a ﬁxed wage at stage 2d. To avoid the complexities induced by a ﬁxed wage, we notice
that risk neutral workers would value equally an appropriately chosen random payment,
provided that the expected wage is unchanged. So, we assume that the current total
wage paid to an employee, W, is proportional to the quantity of inventories sold at stage
2c. We further assume that the bargaining is over the expected wage E(W),s ot h eﬁrm
commits to adjust the piece rate so that the expected wage of a worker is independent of
her employer’s demand and supply behaviors.
At the beginning of stage 2b, a worker can be either employed or unemployed. Her
maximized lifetime expected utility depends on her money holdings m at that moment.
Let respectively Ve (m) and Vu (m) be the value functions of an employed (unemployed)
worker at stage 1c.
Consider ﬁrst the program of an unemployed worker with money holdings m.W e
ignore unemployment beneﬁts. Because of frictions on the product market, the number
of goods bought during the period is a random variable, denoted X. To characterize the
distribution of X,w en o t i c et h a te a c ho ft h ed units of demand expressed can be seen as a
random trial with a probability of success of μ(φ). At an individual level, these trials are
independent. Hence, X follows a binomial distribution with d trials and success probability








x · (1 − μ(φ))
d−x
In particular, we notice that Pr(X = d) > 0. So, there is always a positive probability
that all the d units of demand expressed are satisﬁed. The expected purchase, conditional5
on expressing d units of demand, is:
E(X)=μ(φ) · d (5)
For any realization x of X, the unemployed worker enjoys x units of utility and will start
the next period with m − p · x units of money. Furthermore, at stage 1a of the next
period, she will ﬁnd a job with probability θh(θ) and therefore gets an expected lifetime
utility6 of Ve (m − p · x). Finally, with the remaining probability, she remains unemployed.
Her expected lifetime utility is then Vu (m − p · x). Therefore, the value function of an
unemployed worker solves the following Bellman equation:








s.t : p · d ≤ m
5To ease notations, this conditionality does not appear in the notations.
6Recall that we consider only steady states. Hence value functions are time-invariant.
10Consider now an employed worker. She will receive a random wage W. For any
realization x of X and n of W, the employed worker enjoys x units of utility. At the
beginning of the next period, she will own m+n−p·x units of money. With probability 1−s,
she will be employed and will therefore get an expected lifetime utility of Ve (m + n − p · x).
With probability s, she will loose her job and will therefore beneﬁt from an expected
lifetime utility of Vu (m + n − p · x). Hence, the value function of an employed worker
solves the Bellman equation:








s.t : p · d ≤ m
Since individuals’ preferences are linear with respect to the number of goods consumed,
we guess that value functions are linear in m and of the form (Appendix A.1 formally
veriﬁes this claim):
Ve (m)=Ve + m · A and Vu (m)=Vu + m · A (8)
where Ve, Vu and A are constant values. A stands for the marginal value of money. Ve
(Vu) is the value of being employed (unemployed). Under the speciﬁcation (8), and given
(5), the ﬁrst-order7 and envelope conditions to programs (6) and (7) are the same. They
are respectively:
0=μ(φ)
1 − p · A
1+r




where λ ≥ 0 is the (non-negative) Kuhn-and-Tucker multiplier associated to the con-
straint8 m ≥ p · d. Substituting λ from the ﬁrst-order conditions and multiplying the
envelope conditions by p gives:
p · A =
μ(φ)+( 1− μ(φ)) · p · A
1+r
To interpret this asset equation, we notice that with p additional units of money at the start
of stage 2b, the consumer can express one additional unit of demand. With probability
μ(φ), this additional unit of demand will be satisﬁe d ,t h a ti s ,t h ec o n s u m e rw i l lﬁnd
the good she is searching for, will buy and consume it. This will generate a utility level
normalized to 1/(1 + r). With the remaining probability, the consumer ends stage 2c of
the current period with p units of money, that are valued p · A. The last equation can be
rewritten to express p · A as a function of the demand satisfying probability μ(φ) and the
discount rate r:




7We henceforth consider that d is a real number and not an integer, which simpliﬁes the problem.
8Since r>0, the envelope condition implies λ > 0. Hence, the exclusion condition λ(m − p · d)=0
implies d = m/p. Therefore, the constraint d ≥ 0 does not bind.
11We call the right-hand side of (9) the rationing of demand term. This term accounts for
the fact that it is better to consume a unit of good than to have p units of money. In
the absence of discounting, the rationing of demand term is equal to 1. When conversely
consumers discount the future, they have to wait at least one period before spending their
money and the rationing of demand term is lower than 1. As tightness on the product
market φ increases, the demand satisfying probability μ(φ) declines and the rationing of
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Figure 2: Rationings on the Product market
Furthermore, since p·A<1, a consumer always expects a positive net gain μ(φ)(1− p · A)
when she expresses an additional unit of demand. Therefore, she expresses the maximum
amount of demand, given her money holdings. So, d = m/p. Finally, using (8), equations
(6) and (7) implies
r · Vu = θh(θ)(Ve − Vu) and r · Ve = E(W) · A + s(Vu − Ve) (10)
which are the usual asset equations for, respectively, the value of being unemployed and
of being employed (see e.g. Pissarides 2000 or Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004). The only
diﬀerence is that wage W being random, only its expectation enters (10).
III.4 The entrepreneurs’ program
At the beginning of stage 1b, an entrepreneur owns m units of money, a level of inventory
ζ and employs l workers. She must choose how many units of demand d to express,
how many units of supply σ to express and how many vacancies ω to open, subject to
constraints (2) and (3). Let Vf (m,ζ,l) be her value function at that moment.
12A si nt h ec a s eo faw o r k e r ,t h en u m b e rX of goods consumed, conditional on the level
of demand d is a random variable that follows a binomial distribution. Symmetrically, let
the random number of goods sold be denoted by Y . Each unit of good supplied will be sold
according to the supply satisfying probability φμ(φ). At the individual level, these trials
are independent and independent of X. Therefore Y follows a binomial distribution with
σ trials and a probability of success φμ(φ). Hence the density function is B(y,σ,φμ(φ)),
with:
E(Y )=φμ(φ) · σ (11)
The worker and the ﬁrm bargain over the expected wage E(W). For each unit of good








The number of workers that will be hired during stage 1a of the next period is also a
random variable denoted Z. Since the job ﬁlling probability is h(θ), Z follows a binomial
distribution of ω independent trials with success probability h(θ). The number of job dis-
solved is also a random variable R that follows a binomial distribution with l employment
and a success probability s. Finally, the number of inventories depreciated is a random
variable ∆ that follows a binomial distribution with ζ trials and a success probability δ.
We hence get:
E(Z)=h(θ) · ω E(R)=s · l E(∆)=δ · ζ (13)
For any realization x of X, y of Y , z of Z, r of R and ² of ∆, the entrepreneur consumes
x units of goods, which generates x units of utility. Opening ω vacancies induces a total
disutility of k·ω,w h e r ek>0 is a parameter. She sells y of units of goods, thereby getting
p·y units of money. For each unit of goods sold, she pays w units of money to each of her
l employees. Hence, her money holdings at the beginning of stage 1a of the next period
will be m+1 = m+p·(y − x)−W ·l,w h e r eW = w ·y. The output of l workers increases
inventories by an amount of q · l,o fw h i c hy units are sold and ε units are depreciated.
Therefore her inventories at the beginning of the next period will be ζ+1 = ζ+q·l−y−ε. r
jobs are dissolved, but z new workers are recruited. So, her future employment level after
stage 1a of the next period will be l+1 = l − r + z. Finally, her expected lifetime utility





the entrepreneur’s value function solves the following Bellman equation:











s.t : m+1 = m + p · (Y − X) − W · l ζ+1 = ζ − ∆ − Y + q · l
l+1 = l − R + Zw =
E(W)
E(Y )
13Since entrepreneurs’ preferences are linear with respect to the number of goods consumed
and the number of jobs opened, we guess that the value function is linear in m, ζ and l
and that it takes the form (Appendix A.2 formally veriﬁes this claim):
Vf (m,ζ,l)=m · A + ζ · G + l · J (15)
where A, G and J are constants that stand for the marginal values of respectively money,
inventory and a ﬁlled job. Let λ and η be the (non-negative) Kuhn-and-Tucker multipliers
associated to constraints m ≥ p · d and ζ ≥ σ. Given (5), (11), (12), (13), and the
speciﬁcation (15), the ﬁrst-order conditions of program (14) with respect to individual




1 − p · A
¢
1+r
− λ · p 0=
φμ(φ)
¡
p · A − G
¢
1+r
− η 0 ≥
−k + h(θ) · J
1+r





+ λ G =
1 − δ
1+r
G + η J =
(1 − s)J + q · G − E(W) · A
1+r
Substituting λfrom the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to d into the envelope condi-
tion with respect to money holdings m gives (9). Therefore, one has A = A which means
that entrepreneurs and workers value money identically. Furthermore, as for workers, en-
trepreneurs express the maximum amount of demand permitted by their money holdings
and d = m/p.
Turning now to supply decisions, substituting η from the ﬁrst-order condition with
respect to supply σ into the envelope condition with respect to inventories ζ gives:
G =
φμ(φ) · p · A +( 1− δ − φμ(φ)) · G
1+r
The interpretation for this equation parallels the one of equation (9). An additional
unit of inventory will be sold during stage 2c with probability φμ(φ). The entrepreneur
then gets p units of money, which are valued p · A. With probability 1 − δ − φμ(φ) the
good is neither sold nor depreciated. This asset equation can be rewritten as:
G =
φμ(φ)
r + δ + φμ(φ)
· p · A (16)
We call the right-hand side of (16) the rationing of supply term. This term accounts for
the fact that it is better to have p units of money than a unit of inventory. In the absence
9From the enveloppe conditions over respectively m and ζ,w es e et h a tλ > 0 and η > 0 so constraints
(2) and (3) are binding and therefore, constraints 0 ≤ d and 0 ≤ σ are not bidding.
14of discounting and depreciation, the rationing of supply term is equal to 1.O t h e r w i s e ,t h i s
term is lower than 1. As tightness on the product market φ increases, the supply satisfying
probability φμ(φ) rises, and the rationing of supply term increases. The increasing curve
in Figure 2 represents this phenomenon. Furthermore, since G<p· A,a ne n t r e p r e n e u r
always expects a positive net gain φμ(φ)(p · A − G) from the supply of one additional
unit of good. Therefore, she supplies all her inventory: σ = ζ.
The envelope condition over employment l implies:
(r + s)J = q · G − E(W) · A (17)
During each period, a job produces q additional units of inventories, each of them
being valued G. Furthermore, the ﬁrm has to pay an expected wage E(W). Hence, the
right hand side of (17) represents the expected current proﬁto naﬁlled job. Given the
probability s of destruction, the lifetime value of a job discounts this current proﬁta tr a t e
r + s.
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to vacancies ω relates the cost of posting a
vacancy k to the lifetime expected proﬁt from searching for a worker. The latter equals
the job ﬁlling probability h(θ) times the value of a ﬁlled job J. If the cost is larger than
the expected proﬁts, ﬁrms prefer not to search for workers. Then, the aggregate number
υ of vacancies decreases. Tightness on the labor market θ therefore decreases (since the
number of unemployed workers is predetermined) and so does the job ﬁlling probability
h(θ).I f h(0) · J ≤ k, ﬁrms post no vacancies. Otherwise, the preceeding phenomenon
continues until k = h(θ)·J. This equality corresponds to the so-called free-entry condition
in the standard labor matching model. Given (17) we get the usual free-entry condition




III.5 The labor market equilibrium
At stage 1c, each employed worker negotiate its expected wage E(W) with her employer.
We assume generalized Nash bargaining. Let β ∈ (0,1) denote workers’ bargaining power.
From (8), the surplus extracted by the worker from employment Ve (m) − Vu (m) is inde-
pendent of her money holdings m. Symmetrically, from (15), the marginal value of a job J
for an entrepreneur is independent of her money holdings m, inventories ζ,o re m p l o y m e n t





15taking workers’ outside option V u as given. Given (10) and (17), the ﬁrst-order condition
leads to the following sharing rule:
(1 − β)(Ve − Vu)=β · J (19)
Hence, the total surplus generated by a job Ve − Vu + J is split in shares β and 1 − β
between the worker and her employer. From (10), we then have:
(r + s)(Ve − Vu)=E(W) · A − β · θh(θ) · (Ve − Vu + J)
Together with (17), we get:
(r + s + β · θh(θ)) · (Ve − Vu + J)=q · G
Together with the free-entry condition (18) and the sharing rule (19), the last equation








= q · G (20)
Following Assumption AS1, the left-hand side of (20) is an increasing function of θ.W h e n
θ increases from 0 to +∞, the left hand side increases from (r + s)k/(1 − β) to +∞.
Therefore, if q·G>(r + s)k/(1 − β), there exists a unique equilibrium value of the labor
market tightness θ that satisﬁes (20). Otherwise, a ﬁlled job generates too few utility, so
entrepreneurs prefer not to open vacancies and θ =0 . This is summarized in the following
lemma
Lemma 1 There exists a single equilibrium valu ef o rt h el a b o rm a r k e tt i g h t n e s s .I fG>
(r + s)k/(q(1 − β)), this values is the unique solution of (20). Otherwise, θ =0 .
The functioning of the product market aﬀects the labor market only through the value
of a unit of inventory G. This is because the wage payment scheme is adjusted so that
the total surplus generated by a job is split between the worker and her employer. Hence,
the vacancy supply behavior only depends on the total surplus from a job. This surplus is
proportional to the total value of the q units of goods produced by a job within a period.
Equilibrium labor market tightness is therefore an increasing function of the value G of a
unit of inventory and of the productivity q of a job. We also obtain the usual comparative
static properties with respect to the labor market parameters. A rise in the workers’
bargaining power β, in the job separation probability s, or in the vacancy cost k decreases
equilibrium labor market tightness θ.
Finally, using (10) and (17), the sharing rule (19) implies
E(W) · A = β · q · G +( 1− β) · θh(θ) · (Ve − Vu)
16Using again (19) with the free-entry condition (18) gives ﬁnally the value of the expected
wage:
E(W) · A = β {q · G + k · θ} (21)
III.6 The ﬁxed price Equilibrium
In the two last subsections, we have seen that workers and entrepreneurs choose to express
as many units of demand as they are allowed to, given the constraint (3). Let M be the
exogenous aggregate money stock. At the macroeconomic level, aggregate demand D is
then equal to M/p. Symmetrically, entrepreneurs choose to supply all their inventories.
Hence, at the macroeconomic level, aggregate supply of product Σ equals the total level





From (4) rewritten in steady state, we get the ﬂow equilibrium condition on the product
market:
S =
(1 − u) · q
δ + φμ(φ)
(23)
The aggregate level of inventories S is an increasing function of the productivity level
q and of the steady-state level of employment 1 − u. The steady-state level of inventories
decreases with the depreciation rate δ and the probability of selling supplied goods φμ(φ).
From D = M/p, we notice that our model amounts to putting “Money in the Matching
Function”. It is worth stressing that the distribution of the money holdings does not aﬀect
the level of demand for produced goods. This is because every agent values money identi-
cally. This property comes from the fact that the returns on money holdings are linear at
the individual level: holding a twice bigger amount of money permits to simultaneously
search for twice more goods and thereby to double the ﬂow of consumed goods.
We are now ready to deﬁne the ﬁxed price equilibrium. A ﬁxed price equilibrium is a
list {A,G,φ,θ,S,u,E(W)} that veriﬁes i) The asset equations for the marginal values of
money (9) and inventories (16); ii) the labor market equilibrium condition (20); iii)t h e
demand and supply behaviors, as summarized by (22); iv)T h eﬂow equilibrium condition
on the labor market, which implies (1); v)T h eﬂow equilibrium condition on the product
market (23); vi) The wage equation (21).
We now explain how to reduce this equilibrium to the analysis of two curves in the
(φ,θ) space. Combining (9) and (16), we get:
G = Γ(φ) where Γ(φ) ≡
φμ(φ)





A unit of good produced is transformed into utility in two steps. First, production is
not sold instantaneously. The imperfection of this process is represented by the ﬁrst
17term deﬁning Γ(.),i . e . ,t h erationing of supply term. Second, p units of money cannot
instantaneously be used to buy a good. The imperfection of this process is represented by
the second term, i.e. the rationing of demand term. Each of these two steps are uncertain
and take time due to the presence of frictions on the product market. Function Γ(.)
summarizes the consequence of these two imperfections. We prove in Appendix B the
following lemma:
Lemma 2 Under assumptions AS2 and 3, function Γ(φ) is hump shaped, with zero limit




















The hump-shaped proﬁle of function Γ(.) is a key property of our model. When
tightness on the product market is suﬃciently low (φ < ˜ φ), a rise in φ relaxes more the
rationing of supply than it reinforces the rationing of demand.T h a ti sG/(p · A) increases
more than p · A decreases with φ. Then, increasing φ r a i s e st h ep a c ea tw h i c hau n i to f
production is transformed into utility Γ(φ). The opposite holds when φ > ˜ φ. (See Figure
2).
For a given value of φ, when the discount rate r increases, agents are more impatient
and both values of inventories G and of money holdings A decrease. As a consequence,
the three curves in Figure 2 shift downwards, and Γ(φ) decreases. The opposite hold
when the product market matching function parameter μ0 increases. Finally, a rise in the
depreciation rate δ increases the depreciation ﬂow of inventories. The rationing of supply
term in (16) and therefore Γ shift downwards in Figure 2.
Combining (20) and (24), we can express the equilibrium labor market tightness θ as








= q · Γ(φ) (26)
The eﬀects of μ0, φ and δ on tightness θ on the labor market come through changes in
the value of Γ. Since the left-hand side of (26) is an increasing function of θ,t h e s ee ﬀects
can immediately be illustrated by rescaling the y- a x i so fF i g u r e2i nt e r m so fθ.E q u a t i o n
(26) is represented in Figures 2 and 3 by the curve labelled LL. Following lemma 2, a
rise in φ increases (decreases) θ if φ < e φ (resp. φ > e φ). For any value of φ,ar i s ei nδ
or a decline in the scale parameter of the matching function μ0 lower Γ(.) and hence θ.
Finally, an increase in the discount rate r decreases θ through two channels. In addition
to the negative eﬀect on Γ(φ), there is the standard negative eﬀect on job creation (see
Pissarides 2000).




q = S (δ + φμ(φ))













A rise in tightness on the labor market θ implies a higher steady-state level of em-
ployment 1 − u. Therefore, more output is produced during each period, which raises
inventories S. Since the aggregate Money supply M is ﬁxed and the price p is exogenous,
the steady-state level of tightness on the product market φ decreases, too. This can be
seen from the right-hand side of (27), which decreases with φ. Therefore, the two ﬂow
equilibrium conditions deﬁne φ as a decreasing function of θ at the steady-state. This








Δp > 0 ΔΜ < 0
Figure 3: The Fixed Price Equilibrium
Assuming exogenous price is not a very relevant assumption for a steady-state equi-
librium. We made it essentially for pedagogical reasons in order to build a more general
model step by step. We therefore do not devote too much attention to the study of this
equilibrium. Neither existence nor uniqueness are guaranteed. However, a noticeable prop-
erty is the ambiguous eﬀect of a decline in Aggregate Demand D = M/p on equilibrium,
coming from either a rise in price p or a decrease in money supply M.
Ad e c r e a s ei nD has no eﬀect on the LL curve (see Equation 26). However, such decline
reduces the amount of goods exchanged on the product market T (S,D). For a given level
of tightness on the labor market θ,t h e r e b yag i v e nﬂow of produced goods q(1 − u),t h e
level of inventories S increases, which oﬀset the reduction in T (S,D). Hence, from (22),
19t h ed e c r e a s ei nD and the increase in S lead to a decrease in φ (see 27). This is illustrated
in Figure 3 by the shift of the DD curve to the left.
Now, such a decline of φ has an ambiguous eﬀect on the value of inventories G,t h e r e b y
on tightness on the labor market θ a n do nu n e m p l o y m e n tu.I f φ < e φ, the decline in φ
decreases Γ(φ) and we get the standard eﬀect: a rise in price p, or a decrease in money
supply M decreases labor market tightness θ and increases unemployment u. However, if
φ > e φ,w eg e tt h er e v e r s ee ﬀects: the reduction in φ improves more the value of money
holdings (by increasing the probability of ﬁnding a seller) than it deteriorates the value of
inventories relative to the value of money holdings (by decreasing the probability of ﬁnding
a customer). Therefore, the value of inventories increases, thereby increasing tightness on
the labor market and decreasing unemployment.
IV Endogenous price
Various assumptions could be made about price determination in the product market. We
assume that sellers post prices, that is they annonce take-it-or-leave-it prices and commit
to sell production at this price. To us, this seems to be the most natural assumption for
price setting in the product market. However, we are aware that the price of goods are
also sometimes bargained over.
We build upon the price posting equilibrium of Moen (1997), also known as the Com-
petitive Search Equilibrium (henceforth CSE). Prices are observable at no cost, search is
directed and mobility of agents is perfect. The product market is now made of a con-
tinuum of identical submarkets indexed by i ∈ I. Each submarket is characterized by a
price pi. At the beginning of stage 2c of a given period, there are Σi units of supply and
Di units of demand in market i. The matching technology is identical across submarkets.
Then, a unit of demand (supply) in submarket i is satisﬁed (is sold) with probability μ(φi)
(φiμ(φi)) in submarket i,w h e r eφi = Di/Σi is the tightness in the ith submarket.
In a CSE, submarkets with a higher price attract relatively more supply and less
demand. Tightness is therefore lower in submarkets with a higher price, which implies
a higher (a lower) demand (supply) satisfying probability. Hence, consumers trade oﬀ a
lower price against a higher probability of ﬁnding the desired goods, whereas entrepreneurs
trade oﬀ a higher price against a lower probability of selling their inventories. We now
detail the agents’ behaviors. The timing of events is given in Figure 4.
Consider ﬁrst a consumer with money holdings m. In stage 2b, she has now to decide
the number di of units of demand to located in each submarket i. The number of goods
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Figure 4: The timing of events along a CSE
B(x,di,μ(φi)) and mean:
E(Xi)=μ(φi) · di (28)















As for the ﬁxed price model, a consumer is not allowed to search for a good she cannot




pi · di ≤ m (29)
Consider now the supply behavior of an entrepreneur with total inventory ζ at the
beginning of stage 2a. She has now to decide how many units of inventory to supply in
each submarket. Let σi be its supply on submarket i and let Yi be the random number of
goods sold in submarket i. The (discrete) density function of Yi is B(y,σi,φiμ(φi)),w i t h
mean:
E(Yi)=φiμ(φi) · σi (30)














pi · φiμ(φi) · σi
21As for the ﬁxed price model, an entrepreneur cannot sold a good she has not yet produced.




σi ≤ ζ (31)
Finally, for each unit of good sold in submarket i,t h eﬁrm has to give wi ≤ pi units
to each of her l employees. The wi are set so as to guaranty a negotiated level of the
expected wage W received by workers. Hence equation (12), should now be replaced by
X
i∈I
wi · E(Yi)=E(W) · l
However, since the wage bargain is over the expected wage, entrepreneurs take their de-
mand and supply decisions taking E(W) as given. We are now ready to write workers
and entrepreneurs’ programs. For workers, the only diﬀerence is on the multidimension-
ality of the demand decisions. Therefore programs (6) and (7) should now be respectively
rewritten as:














s.t : m+1 = m −
X
i∈I



















s.t : m+1 = m + W −
X
i∈I




Rewriting the entrepreneurs’ program is slightly more complex since the supply deci-
sions are multidimensional too. Hence (14) becomes:

















s.t : m+1 = m +
X
i∈I
pi · (Yi − Xi) − W · l ζ+1 = ζ − ∆ −
X
i∈I
Yi + q · l




0 ≤ m −
X
i∈I




22Since preferences are linear in consumption, we again guess that value functions are
linear and of the form speciﬁed in equations (8) and (15). We start with the analysis of
demand decisions at stage 2b10.L e tλ be the (non negative) Kuhn-and-Tucker multiplier
associated to the inequality constraint (29). Given (28) and the speciﬁcations (8) and
(15), the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to di of programs (32) (33) and (34) are:
0 ≥
μ(φi)(1− pi · A)
1+r
− λ · pi with = if di > 0













=0 , we conclude that constraint (29) binds. Therefore, there are at
least some submarkets where consumers express a positive demand di > 0 .F o r t h e s e
submarkets, the interpretation of the ﬁrst-order condition is similar to the one given in
Section III.3. With the envelope condition, it can be written as




This equation deﬁnes a decreasing relationship between the price level in submarket i and
tightness in this submarket. During stage 2b, the supply decisions had been chosen. Hence




⇔ r · pi · A>μ(φi)(1− pi · A)
(resp. <), the opportunity cost of expressing a unit of demand in submarket i,n a m e l y
r · pi · A, is higher (lower) than the expected gain from expressing a unit of demand on
submarket i μ(φi)(1− pi · A). Consumers therefore exit (enter) this submarket, which
shifts total demand Di downwards (upwards). Therefore, tightness φi on this submarket
decreases (increases) and the demand satisfying probability μ(φi) increases (decreases).
This process continues until (35) is met. Through this free-entry mechanism, consumers
accept to express a demand on a submarket with a higher price if and only if the probability
μ(φi) is higher, that is when tightness φi is lower. Hence (35) holds with equality for all
submarkets.
We now turn to supply decisions. Let η be the (non negative) Kuhn-and-Tucker
multiplier associated to inequality constraint (31). Given (30), (13) and the speciﬁcation
(15), the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to σi of program (34) writes:
0 ≥
φiμ(φi)(pi · A − G)
1+r
− η with = if σi > 0
10That A = ¯ A isn taken for granted here. See, the arguments in III.4.





From the envelope condition, we conclude that η > 0. Hence, by the exclusion condition,
we know that constraint (31) binds. This induces that there exists at least one submarket
e where ﬁrms supply some inventories. This leads to the following condition
G =
φeμ(φe)
r + δ + φeμ(φe)
pe · A
that can be interpreted as in III.4. Using (35), we ﬁnally get for this (these) submarket(s):
G = Γ(φe) (36)
Conversely, for the other submarkets labelled d, one has
(r + δ) · G>φdμ(φd)(pd · A − G)
The opportunity cost of supplying one additional good on one of these submarkets (r + δ)·
G is higher than the probability to sell a good φdμ(φd) times the gain of having pd units
of money instead of a unit of inventory pd·A−G. Using (35), we get for these submarkets:
G>Γ(φd)
Hence, in a CSE, only the submarket(s) for which tightness maximizes function Γ(.)
are active. From Lemma 2, we know that a unique value e φ maximizes Γ(φ). Therefore,





It is straightforward to verify that the envelope condition over the entrepreneur’s em-
ployment level and the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to vacancies ω are unchanged.
Hence equation (17) characterizing the value of ﬁlled job and the free-entry condition (18)
are still valid. It is also straightforward to verify that Equation (10) remains unchanged.
Therefore, the outcome of the wage bargain is the same in the ﬁxed price equilibrium
and in the CSE. As a consequence, equation (20) expressing labor market tightness θ as a
function of the value of inventory G is unchanged.
We are now ready to characterize the CSE. The price setting mechanism sets tightness
on the product market to the unique maximizer of Γ(.),s oφ = ˜ φ. We then get G thanks





> (r + s)k/(q(1 − β)) and there exists a single value of θ that solves (26) and this
value is positive; or ﬁrms ﬁnd not proﬁtable to post vacancies and θ =0 .
The ﬂow equilibrium condition on the labor market (1) yields a unique unemployment
rate u. Then, the level of inventories S is given by (23). These relationships fully char-
acterize the real part of the economy. The equilibrium price level p is given by (22), as a
function of φ, money supply M and inventories S. From above, we conclude:




> (r + s)k/(q(1 − β)),t h e nθ > 0
and u ∈ (0,1).
We can now turn to the comparative statics. An improvement in the labor market
determinants (i.e. a rise in the productivity level q or a decrease in the bargaining power
β, in the vacancy disutility cost k or in the separation rate s)d o e sn o ti n ﬂuence the
equilibrium value of φ and has the same eﬀect as before on the labor market: θ increases
and unemployment decreases. Inventories increases (see (23)). Finally, aggregate demand
D = M/p has to increase to absorb the additional inventories keeping tightness on the
product market φ unchanged. Hence the price p decreases.
Al e s se ﬃcient matching function on the product market (a decline in μ0), or an
increase or in the depreciation rate δ change φ. However, since the equilibrium value of





thereby G. Tightness on the labor market thus decreases (see (26)) and unemployment
increases. An increase in the discount rate r has the same qualitative eﬀects. However,
the labor market is aﬀected directly and indirectly through φ.
Finally, a rise in the money supply has no eﬀect on tightness φ in the product market.
As a consequence, G, θ, u and S remain unchanged. Then, price p increases in the same
proportion as the money supply to keep aggregate demand D unchanged. This proves
the long-run neutrality of money in our model. A permanent increase in the level of the
money supply has no real eﬀect and change only nominal variables proportionally. In the
next section, we will investigate the long-run super-neutrality of Money, which concerns
the eﬀects of a permanent change in the rate of growth of money supply.
VM o n e t a r y g r o w t h
In this section, we introduce monetary growth in the model of Section IV. At the end of




This additional money is distributed to the mass 1 of workers in a lump-sum fashion. Let
T be the corresponding transfer, with: T = M+1 − M = π · M+1. The timing of events is
hence described by Figure 5.
In steady state, all real variables are constant, whereas nominal variables evolves pro-
portionally to money supply M. It is therefore convenient to rewrite these variables in
intensive terms. To do so, we divide nominal variables by the aggregate Money supply.
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Figure 5: The timing of events along a CSE with monetary growth
an individual whose money holdings is m. We similarly denote b w = w/M and b pi = pi/M.
It turns out to be very convenient to take intensive b m rather than gross money holdings
m as a state variable in the Bellman equations. Consider a worker with gross money
holdings e m at the end of stage 2d of the current period. She will receives the lump sum
transfer T = π · M+1 at stage 3. Her next period intensive money holdings is therefore
b m+1 =( e m + T)/M+1 =( 1− π)(e m/M)+π. Keeping this in mind, Bellman Equations
(32) (33) and (34) become:



















b pi · Xi
!
+ π and 0 ≤ b m −
X
i∈I
b pi · di
for unemployed workers,














s.t : b m+1 =( 1 − π)
Ã
b m + c W −
X
i∈I
b pi · Xi
!
+ π and 0 ≤ b m −
X
i∈I
b pi · di
26for employed workers, and






















b pi · (Yi − Xi) − c W · l
!
ζ+1 = ζ − ∆ −
X
i∈I







0 ≤ b m −
X
i∈I




for entrepreneurs. We again guess that value functions are of the form given by (8) and
( 1 5 ) ,e x c e p tt h a tw ed e n o t e b A, the marginal value of intensive money holdings. Let λ
and η be again the non-negative Kuhn-and-Tucker multiplier associated respectively to
constraints (29) and (31). The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to demand di and the




1 − b pi · b A(1 − π)
´
1+r
− λ · b pi and b A =
1 − π
1+r
b A + λ
An additional unit of intensive money during stage 2d of the current period implies M
additional gross units of money at that time, thereby at stage 1b of the next period.
Therefore, the induced increase of intensive money at the next period will only be 1 − π.
Hence, the growth of money supply generates a depreciation process for intensive money
holdings that appears in the envelope condition. Moreover, the expected gain when a
unit of demand is satisﬁed in submarket i is 1 − b pi · b A(1 − π). Hence, applying the same
reasoning as earlier leads to:
b pi · b A =
μ(φi)
r + π +( 1− π)μ(φi)
(40)
The rationing of demand term now includes a parameter that represents the depreciation
eﬀect of monetary growth on money holdings: the rate of inﬂation π in (40) plays a similar
role as the depreciation probability δ in the rationing of supply (see (16) or (41) below).
For the supply decisions, the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to supply σi and the




b pi · b A(1 − π) − G
´
1+r




A unit of good sold at price pi (hence at the intensive price b pi), is not valued b pi · b A but
b pi· b A(1 − π) because of inﬂation. Therefore, for submarkets e where ﬁrms choose to supply
27some inventories, one has (r + δ)G = φeμ(φe)
³
b pe · b A(1 − π) − G
´
,a n ds o :
G =
φeμ(φe)
r + δ + φeμ(φe)
b pe · b A(1 − π) (41)




r + δ + φμ(φ)
·
(1 − π) · μ(φ)
r + π +( 1− π) · μ(φ)
(42)
Conversely, for submarkets d where ﬁrms ﬁnd non-proﬁtable to supply goods, one has
(r + δ)G>φdμ(φd)
³
b pd · b A(1 − π) − G
´
. This, together with (40) induces G>Γ(φd).
Therefore, at equilibrium, only submarkets where tightness maximizes function Γ(.) are
active. Appendix 2 show that, under Assumptions AS2 and AS3 the redeﬁned function




















Hence, as before, only a single submarket is active at a time where φe = ˜ φ.F r o m t h e
envelope condition over employment l, Equation (17) is replaced by:




· b A(1 − π) (44)
From (37) and (38), we get that equation (10) is replaced by




· b A(1 − π)+π · b A + s(Vu − Ve) (45)
This is because the wage is only paid at stage 2d of the current period, and so, will only be
valued in the next period. Since this process is symmetric for workers and ﬁrms, inﬂation
does not aﬀect the sharing rule (19). Finally, from the ﬁrst-order condition over vacancies
in (39), the free-entry condition (18) remains. Hence, equation (20) still determines the
equilibrium value of the labor market tightness θ as a function of the value of inventory
G. Then the CSE with inﬂation is still uniquely recursively characterized by (43), (20),
(1) and (23). At each period, the price level is given by (27). The only novelty is the
redeﬁnition of function Γ(.) in (42).
We now consider how a rise in money growth aﬀects the real part of the economy. A
rise in π reinforces the rationing of demand,s i n c e(1 − π)·μ(φ)/(r + π +( 1− π) · μ(φ))
decreases with π for any given φ. Hence, as for the depreciation rate of inventories δ,t h e
maximized value of Γ decreases (applying the envelope theorem). From equation (26),
tightness θ on the labor market decreases, so unemployment u increases (see 1). Finally,
according to Appendix B, the equilibrium value ˜ φ decreases.
Proposition 2 In steady state, a permanent rise in money growth π decreases θ,i n c r e a s e s
the unemployment rate u and decreases tightness on the product market.
28VI Ineﬃciency
In this section we investigate whether the CSE equilibrium is socially eﬃcient. We adopt a
utilitarian social welfare fucntion. There is a positive ﬂow of utility derived from transac-
tions and a disutility ﬂow derived from vacancy posting. Since Σ = S, the social objective
Ω therefore equals the discounted sum of T (S,D) − k · υ.
To see whether the equilibrium value of φ is socially eﬃcient, we consider a marginal
departure from the CSE, taking tightness on the labor market θ (hence the unemployment
rate u, and the mass of vacant jobs υ)a sﬁxed. The social planner controls tightness on
the product market φ, while total inventories S evolve according to (4). Taken S = Σ into
account, (4) becomes:
S+1 =( 1− u)q +( 1− δ − φμ(φ))S (46)
This is equivalent to assuming that the social planner controls aggregate demand D =
M/p, but that inventories’ dynamics remains determined by the matching frictions on the




· q(1 − u) (47)
Starting from a steady state, Figure 6 considers the eﬀect of a permanent rise in φ
when u and υ are ﬁxed (see panel a). As a consequence, the probability to sell each good
increases. If δ > 0, goods have therefore less chance to depreciate. Then, the ﬂow of
consumed goods T (S,D) increases in steady state, thereby increasing social welfare Ω.








T(S,D) = φμ(φ) S
t
(c) : δ = 0
t0 t0
T(S,D) = φμ(φ) S
(d) : δ > 0
Figure 6: The eﬀect of a permanent rise of φ on the social objective.
29Moreover, there is an additional eﬀect that occurs along the transition to the new
steady state. A permanent rise in φ instantaneously rises T (S,D), but has no immediate
eﬀect on inventories S (see (46) and panels (b) and (c) or (d) of Figure 6). The amount
of supply S decreases progressively to its new steady state value (see panel b). Therefore,
along this transition process, the ﬂow of consumed goods T (S,D)=φμ(φ) · S is higher
than its new steady-state value. As we have seen, if δ > 0, the new steady-state value is
higher (see panel d), while if δ =0 , the new steady-state value of T (S,D) is unchanged
(see panel c). However, in both case, T (S,D) overshoots. As the discount rate increases,
this overshooting has a bigger eﬀect on welfare. Actually, applying our reasoning to any
value of φ, we conclude that welfare always increases with a rise in φ, suggesting that the
optimal value of φ is inﬁnite.
This ineﬃciency property of a CSE may look surprising given the eﬃciency result of
Moen (1997) in a non-monetary economy. The reason for our ineﬃciency result is that
ﬁrms and the social criterion value a transaction on the product market diﬀerently. When
they sell their inventories, entrepreneurs take into account that they will typically not
instantaneously ﬁnd the goods they want to consume. This rationing of demand is due
to the monetary feature of the economy. As we have seen in Section IV, the equilibrium
value of φ trades oﬀ the rationing of demand and the rationing of supply.C o n v e r s e l y ,
the social criterion values the ﬂow of transactions, no matter who consumes the good
exchanged. Therefore, the rationing of demand does not matter, only the rationing of
supply does. This explains why the equilibrium value of tightness on the product market
is always ineﬃciently low.
To conclude this section, we discuss how monetary policy should be conducted to at-
tenuate this ineﬃciency. From above, monetary policy should be used to increase tightness
φ on the product market. This requires to lower inﬂation π. So doing, money depreciates
less and the rationing of demand term (1 − π) · μ(φ)/(r + π +( 1− π) · μ(φ)) increases.
Furthermore, the equilibrium value of tightness φ increases. The latter eﬀect increases the
probability φμ(φ).T h e rationing of supply term φμ(φ)/(r + δ + φμ(φ)) increases and
so does social welfare.
We can now wonder what is the optimal rate of inﬂation, that is, what is the minimum
feasible level of inﬂation. If inﬂation was negative π < 0, the lump sum transfer T = π·M+1
would become a tax T<0 that an unemployed worker with a very low money holdings
cannot pay. Then, the optimal monetary policy would be π =0 .H o w e v e r , i f i t w a s
possible, the Friedman rule according to which π = −r would be the optimal monetary
policy. As explained in Appendix B, when monetary policy tends to the Friedman rule,
the rationing of demand term tends to 1. Furthermore, since φ tends to +∞ inﬁnity, the
30rationing of supply term increases and tends to 1/(1 + r + δ).T h e s et w oe ﬀects together
maximizes Γ(.).
VII Conclusion
In this paper, we have extended the MP labor-matching model by introducing search-
frictions on the product market without the introduction of nominal rigidities. We ac-
count for the persistent diﬃculties that ﬁrms face in selling their production and we are
able to model how these diﬃculties aﬀect equilibrium unemployment. We show that un-
employment is a U-shaped function of tightness on the product market. The parameters
characterizing the labor market have the usual eﬀect on unemployment. Price posting
and directed search on the product market lead to a Competitive Search Equilibrium on
the product market. The equilibrium tightness on the product market is the one that
minimizes the unemployment rate, but is ineﬃciently low. Moreover, a higher level of
inﬂation increases unemployment.
This model can be extended in diﬀerent directions. First, we have only been concerned
with properties in steady state. The transitional dynamics and the cyclical properties of
this economy should be investigated. Second, our model abstracts from public ﬁnance
issues. One can wonder whether ﬁscal deﬁcits can increase aggregate demand and thereby
decrease the equilibrium unemployment rate. To answer this question, we should empiri-
cally investigate whether demand expressed by the government matches more rapidly the
supply of private goods. Finally, one should consider the introduction of a credit market.
A Bellman equations
In this paper, we solve Bellman equations for workers and entrepreneurs by the “Guess
and verify” method (see Ljungvist and Sargent 2000, Page 32). We guess that workers’
(resp. entrepreneurs’) value functions are of the form given by (8) (resp. 15) and derive
the values of A, Ve and Vu (resp. A, G and J) that satisfy Bellman equations. We have
now to verify:
• That each Bellman equation admits a single solution11.H e n c e , i f w e e x h i b i t a
function that solves the Bellman equation, this function necessarily coincides with
the value function. The proof here follows very closely Stockey, Lucas and Prescott
(1989, henceforth SLP).
11Bellman equation are functional equations, that is, equations where the unknown is not (a list of)
number(s) but a function.
31• That given the obtained values of A, Ve, Vu,( A, G, J), the obtained value functions
eﬀectively solve the Bellman equations.
We proove these two results for both workers and entrepreneurs’ Bellman equations.
The proofs are written for the most general case with endogenous prices and inﬂation. The
proof without inﬂation is directly obtained by substituting 0 for π. The proof with ﬁxed
p r i c e si sa g a i nd i r e c t l yo b t a i n e dw i t ht he additional restriction that the set I is reduced
to a singleton.
A.1 Workers’ program
The important point to notice is that a worker can never hold more (intensive) money b m
than the aggregate (intensive) money holdings c M 12,s o0 ≤ b m ≤ c M. Hence, the state
space is bounded. SLP can then be directly applied.





{e,u} to R.L e t f ∈ Fw.W e d e n o t e fi (m) the image of (m,i) ∈ Ωf by f.W e u s e t h e
norm13 kfkw =m a x
(m,i)∈Ωw
|fi (m)|. Hence, (Ωw,k.kw) is a complete metric space.
We now deﬁne an operator T on F. For any f ∈ F, T (f) is a function whose image
is given by the following equalities. If i = u, one has:



















b pi · Xi
!
+ π and 0 ≤ b m −
X
i∈I
b pi · di
If i = e, one has:














s.t : b m+1 =( 1 − π)
Ã
b m + c W −
X
i∈I
b pi · Xi
!
+ π and 0 ≤ b m −
X
i∈I
b pi · di
According to the Bellman equations (37) and (38), the value functions Vu (.) and Ve (.)
deﬁne a ﬁxed point of operator T (.) on F.
12Without inﬂation, forget the adjective “intensive”. One has then 0 ≤ m ≤ M.W i t hi n ﬂation, one has
0 ≤ ˆ m ≤ 1. Let in both cases ˆ M be this max.
13Since Ωw is a bounded subset of R
2, any continuous function mapping Ωw into R is necessarily bounded.
Hence the norm is well deﬁned over Fw.
32• The terms in brackets under the max of (48) and (49) are continous functions of b m
for any given (di)i∈I. Hence, by the theorem of the Maximum (see. e.g. SLP, section
3.3) the right-hand side of (48) and (49) are continous functions of b m.H e n c eT (f)
is continuous over b m,w h i c hi n s u r e st h a tT maps F into itself.
• T veriﬁes the Blackwell condition (see. e.g. SLP, theorem 3.3). This is easy to see
by ﬁxing di. Therefore, T is a contracting mapping function of F into F.
Therefore, T admits a unique ﬁxed point in F. Since workers’ value functions Ve (.)
and Vu (.) deﬁne a ﬁxed point of T,t h eﬁxed point of T coincides with values functions
Ve (.) and Vu (.).
We now verify that given the values of Ve, Vu and b A given in (45) and (40), the value
functions deﬁned by Vi (m)=Vi + b A · b m verify (T (V ))i (b m)=Vi (b m), for any b m and any
i = e,u. We get from (48):


















b pi · Xi
!
+ π and 0 ≤ b m −
X
i∈I
b pi · di
Together with (45), this leads to (T (V ))u (b m)=Vu + T (b m) where,
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33Therefore, the constraint 0 ≤ b m −
X
i∈I
b pi · di binds and we obtain:








= b A · b m
which leads to:




and therefore ends the proof.
A.2 Entrepreneurs’ program
For the entrepreneurs’ program, we notice that along a steady state, the three state vari-
ables of an entrepreneur, namely b m, ζ and l, are bonded, respectively by c M, S and 1−u.





[0,1 − u] into R.F o ra n yf ∈ Ff,w ed e ﬁne the norm kfk =m a x
(m,ζ,l)∈Ωf
|fi (m,ζ,l)|.H e n c e ,
(Ω,k.k) is a complete metric space. We deﬁne the operator Tf over Ff by:






















b pi · (Yi − Xi) − c W · l
!
ζ+1 = ζ − ∆ −
X
i∈I




0 ≤ b m −
X
i∈I




According to the Bellman equation (39), Vf (.,.,.) deﬁnes a ﬁxed point of the operator
Tf. We can replicate the same arguments as before to show that Tf deﬁnes a contraction
mapping Ff into itself. Therefore, a single function solves the Bellman equation (39),
which coincides with entrepreneurs’ value function Vf. It remains to show that given (40),
(41) and (44), one has for any (b m,ζ,l) ∈ Ωf, (Tf (Vf))(b m,ζ,l)=Vf (b m,ζ,l).W eg e tf r o m
(50):











34subject to the constraints in (50). Hence, with (28), (30) and (13)







1 − b pi · b A(1 − π)
´)
(51)







b pi · b A(1 − π) − G
´)
+(1− s)J + q · G − b A(1 − π) · E(W)+m a x
0≤ω
{(−k + h(θ) · J)ω}
From (40), we get
1 − b pi · b A(1 − π)=
r + π






1 − b pi · b A(1 − π)
´




r + π +( 1− π)μ(φi)
· di
=( r + π) · b A ·
X
i∈I
b pi · di
Hence, the constraint 0 ≤ b m −
X
i∈I
b pi · di binds and we get:






1 − b pi · b A(1 − π)
´
=( 1+r) b A · b m (52)
From the ﬁrst-order condition over σi,e i t h e rσi =0or the ith market is active. For this
(these) latter submarkets, we get from (41):
b pi · b A(1 − π) − G =
r + δ
r + δ + φiμ(φi)





b pi · b A(1 − π) − G
´




r + δ + φiμ(φi)




Hence, constraint 0 ≤ ζ −
X
i∈I
σi binds and we have:







b pi · b A(1 − π) − G
´)
=( 1+r)G · ζ (53)
Finally, the ﬁrst order condition over ω implies that either ω =0or k = h(θ)J.I nb o t h
cases, we get (−k + h(θ) · J)ω =0 . Therefore,
(1 − s)J + q · G − b A(1 − π) · E(W)+m a x
0≤ω
{(−k + h(θ) · J)ω} (54)
=( 1 − s)J + q · G − b A(1 − π) · E(W)=( 1+r)J
The last equality following (44). Substituting (52), (53) and (54) in (51), we ﬁnally get
(Tf (Vf))(b m,ζ,l)= b A · b m + G · ζ + l · J = Vf (b m,ζ,l)
which ends the proof.
35BF u n c t i o n Γ(φ)
In this appendix, we take the deﬁnition of Γ(.) that includes money growth (see 42). To get
the properties without inﬂation (as in 24), one should only replace π by 0 in the following
algebra. Function Γ(.) is diﬀerentiable and thereby continuous on R+
∗ . Asymptotically,






















Γ(φ)= l i m
φ→+∞
Γ(φ)=0
For all φ > 0, Γ(φ) > 0.S i n c eΓ is continuous, there exists at least one value e φ such that








=0 . To determine uniqueness of



























r + δ + φμ(φ)
(1 − ε(φ)) −
r + π
r + π +( 1− π) · μ(φ)
ε(φ)
From Assumptions AS2 and AS3,
φΓ0(φ)
Γ(φ) decreases in φ. Hence, there exists a single value




=0 .W ef u r t h e rg e tt h a tΓ0 (φ) ≶ 0




r + δ + φμ(φ)
(1 − ε(φ)) −
r + π
r + π +( 1− π) · μ(φ)
ε(φ)
This last equality gives (43), and (25) if π =0 .S i n c eΦ0
φ < 0 and Φ0
δ > 0 and Φ0
π < 0, ˜ φ
increases with the depreciation rate of inventories δ and decreases with the inﬂation rate
π.
At the Friedman rule (i.e. when π = −r), for any φ ∈ R+
∗ ,t h erationing of demand
term is constant and equal to 1 and for all φ,w eh a v et h a tΦ(φ,....) > 0.T h e r e f o r e ,a n
equilibrium does not exist at the Friedman rule. However, as the inﬂation rate tends to
the Friedman rule, ˜ φ tends to +∞.
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